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With the development of wireless technology, much data communication and processing has been conducted in mobile devices with
wireless connection. As we know that the mobile devices will always be resource-poor relative to static ones though they will improve
in absolute ability, therefore, they cannot process some expensive computational tasks due to the constrained computational
resources. According to this problem, server-aided computing has been studied in which the power-constrained mobile devices can
outsource some expensive computation to a server with powerful resources in order to reduce their computational load. However,
in existing server-aided verification signature schemes, the server can learn some information about the message-signature pair to
be verified, which is undesirable especially when the message includes some secret information. In this paper, we mainly study the
server-aided verification signatures with privacy in which the message-signature pair to be verified can be protected from the server.
Two definitions of privacy for server-aided verification signatures are presented under collusion attacks between the server and the
signer. Then based on existing signatures, two concrete server-aided verification signature schemes with privacy are proposed which
are both proved secure.

1. Introduction
Recent advances in wireless technology have led to mobile
computing [1, 2] which is a technology that enables access to
digital resources at any time, from any location. In mobile
computing, much data communication and processing is
conducted in mobile devices with wireless connection such
as cell-phones, security access-cards, and sensors. Therefore,
mobile computing represents the elimination of time-andplace restrictions imposed by desktop computers and wired
networks. As we know mobile devices must be light and
small to be easily carried around. Such considerations, in
conjunction with a given cost and level of technology, will
exact a penalty in computational resources of mobile devices
such as processor speed. While mobile devices will improve in
absolute ability, they will always be computationally weak in
relation to static ones. As a consequence there are tasks, which
potentially could enlarge a device’s range of application,
which are beyond its reach. A natural solution is to outsource

computations that are too expensive for one device, to other
devices which are more powerful or numerous and connected
to the device. For example, consider a sensor that is presented
with an access-card, sends it a random challenge, and receives
a digital signature of the random challenge. The computation
is required to verify the signature involves public-key operations which are too expensive in both time and space for the
sensor to run. Instead, it could outsource the verification to
a powerful device in order to reduce its computational load.
Recently, with the development of cloud computing, serveraided computation has received widespread attention which
enables power-constrained devices to outsource expensive
computational tasks to a server. The related works such as
server-aided delegated computation [3–8] and server-aided
verification signatures [9–16] have been widely studied. Delegated computation is a protocol between two polynomialtime parties, a client, and a server, to collaborate on the
computation of a function 𝐹. Concretely, the client wants
the server to compute 𝐹(𝑥) for any input instance 𝑥 by
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the delegated computation protocol and verify the correctness of the results that is returned by the server. A key requirement is that the amount of work performed by the client
to generate and verify work instances must be substantially
cheaper than performing the computation on its own.
A server-aided verification signature scheme consists of a
digital signature scheme and a server-aided verification protocol. Signatures can be verified by executing the server-aided
verification protocol with the server, where the verification
requires less computation than the original verification algorithm of the digital signature. Different to delegated computation, the existing server-aided verification signature schemes
can achieve the soundness of the server-aided verification
protocol under their security definitions, namely, a trusted
server cannot convince the verifier that an invalid signature is
valid, and the verifier cannot directly verify the results computed by the server. The notion of server-aided verification
signature was first introduced by Quisquater and de Soete [10]
for speeding up RSA verification with a small exponent. Then,
Lim and Lee [11] extended this idea into discrete-logarithm
based schemes, by proposing efficient protocols for speeding
up the verification of discrete-logarithm based identity proofs
and signatures. Girault and Quisquater [13] introduced a
different approach for server-aided verification signature
which does not require precomputation or randomization.
Its security remains computational, based on the hardness
of a subproblem (viz. factorization) of the initial underlying
problem (viz. composite discrete logarithm). Hohenberger
and Lysyanskaya [17] addressed the situation in which the
server is made of two untrusted softwares, which are assumed
not to communicate with each other. Girault and Lefranc
[14] presented a generic server-aided verification protocol for
digital signatures from bilinear maps which has been used to
construct many digital signature schemes such as [18–23].
As to the security of server-aided verification signature,
many efforts have been devoted to defining strong security
models for it. The schemes [10, 11, 13, 14] considered the
security property based on the assumption that the malicious
server does not have any valid signatures on the message
when it tries to prove an invalid signature of that message
to be valid. Among them, the scheme [13] is computationally
secure based on the hardness of a subproblem of the underlying complexity problem in the original signature scheme.
To give stronger definition of this property, Wu et al. [15]
formally defined this security assuming that the malicious
server may collude with the signer and obtain the secret key
of the signer. They first introduced and defined the existential
unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures and
considered collusion between a signer and a server, who
collaboratively prove an invalid signature to be valid. In
addition, under their security models, they introduced the
server-aided verification for the Waters signature [21] and the
BLS signature [18], respectively.
Though the existing server-aided verification signature
schemes above have been devoted many efforts to their security models, they only considered the soundness to protect the
malicious server who may try to prove an invalid signature of
a message to be valid. However, in some applications where
the message-signature to be verified contains some sensitive
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information, for example, the message contains important
business secrets or is related to medical information, the
verifier does not want the server learn anything about the
message and/or the signature to protect its privacy. So, the
message privacy of the server-aided verification protocol is
also desired besides the soundness. Though in Wu et al. [15],
based on Waters Signature [21] and BLS signature [18], two
SA verification signature schemes (see Section 4 in [15]) were
presented in which the message to be verified is not revealed
to the server, the schemes cannot achieve the soundness
under collusion and adaptively chosen message attacks.
In this paper, we will present two privacy definitions for
server-aided verification signature under collusion by the
server and the signer and adaptive chosen message attacks.
A server-aided verification signature scheme with privacy
also consists of a digital signature scheme and a server-aided
verification protocol.
(1) The first privacy definition for the server-aided verification signature is about message privacy; namely,
the server cannot learn anything about the message
to be verified during the server-aided verification
protocol even if it possesses the secret key of the
signer. Generally, when the verifier wants the server
to verify a message-signature pair, it will “blind” this
message at the beginning of the server-aided verification protocol so that the server cannot obtain any
information about this message, while it can verify
the validity of the message-signature pair by using the
server’s responses.
(2) The second privacy definition for the server-aided
verification signature is about message-signature privacy which is stronger than the first one, and in
this definition, the server can learn nothing about
the message-signature pair to be verified even if it
colludes with the signer. To achieve this privacy, similarly, the verifier will “blind” the message-signature
pair at the beginning of the server-aided verification
protocol so that the server cannot obtain any information about the message or the signature; however
it can verify the validity of the message-signature pair
after the server responds.
For the two privacy notions, we present detailed and strict
security models. Then, under the security models, we present
two concrete constructions for server-aided verification signature based on Waters signature [21] and BLS signature [18]
which, respectively, achieve message privacy and messagesignature privacy. The soundness of the two constructions is
proved under the strong definition of [15] assuming that the
malicious server may collude with the signer and obtain the
secret key of the signer. In addition, the efficiency analysis
of the server-aided verification protocols shows that our two
concrete server-aided verification signature schemes are both
computation saving. Computation saving is probably the
most obvious property that can distinguish a server-aided
verification signature scheme SAV-Σ from an ordinary signature scheme Σ. This property enables the verifier in SAV-Σ

Mobile Information Systems
to check the validity of signatures in a more computationally
efficient way than that in Σ.
Organization. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we will review some fundamental backgrounds, the definition of server-aided verification signatures and the security
notions defined in [15] including existential unforgeability and soundness against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks. In Section 3, we will present the message
privacy of server-aided verification signatures, give a concrete
construction based on Waters signature scheme, and prove
its security under our security model for message privacy.
In Section 4, a stronger privacy of server-aided verification
signatures named message-signature privacy will be defined
and a provably secure concrete construction will be presented
based on BLS signature scheme. Finally we conclude in
Section 5.

2. Preliminaries
2.1. Syntax. Throughout the paper, if A is a randomized
algorithm, then 𝑦 ← A(𝑥) denotes the assignment to 𝑦 of
the output of A on input 𝑥. Unless noted, all algorithms
are probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) and we implicitly
assume that they take an extra parameter 𝜅 in their input,
where 𝜅 is a security parameter.
2.2. Bilinear Maps. Let G1 , G𝑇 be two (multiplicative) cyclic
groups such that |G1 | = |G𝑇 | = 𝑝, where 𝑝 is a large prime. Let
𝑔 be a generator of G1 , and 𝑒 be an admissible bilinear map:
G1 × G1 → G𝑇 , satisfying (1) for all 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ Z𝑝 ; it holds that
𝑒(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 ) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏 ; (2) 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) ≠ 1; and (3) it is efficiently
computable.
We say that (G1 , G𝑇) are bilinear groups if there exists the
bilinear map 𝑒 : G1 ×G1 → G𝑇 as above, and the group action
in G1 and G𝑇 can be computed efficiently. Such groups can be
built from Weil pairing or Tate pairing on elliptic curves.
2.3. Server-Aided Verification Signature. A server-aided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ consists of six algorithms:
ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SA-Verifier-Setup, and
SA-Verify. The first four algorithms are the same as those
in an ordinary signature scheme Σ. SAV-Σ contains three
parties, respectively, a signer, a verifier, and a server.
(i) 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ← ParamGen. This algorithm takes a security
parameter 𝜅 and returns a string 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 as input,
which denotes the common scheme parameters,
including the description of the message space M and
the signature space Ω.
(ii) (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) ← KeyGen(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). This algorithm takes
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 as input and outputs a key pair (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘), where
𝑠𝑘 is the signing key and 𝑝𝑘 is the verification key.
(iii) 𝜎 ← Sign(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). The signer takes a message 𝑚 ∈ M, the system parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 and the key
pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) as inputs, outputs a signature 𝜎.
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(iv) {Valid, Invalid} ← Verify(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝜎, 𝑝𝑘). The verifier takes the parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, a messagesignature pair (𝑚, 𝜎) and the public key 𝑝𝑘,
outputs Valid/Invalid to indicate that 𝜎 is a valid/
invalid signature on 𝑚 under 𝑝𝑘.
(v) VString ← SA-Verifier-Setup(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). The verifier
takes as input the system parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 and outputs a string VString which contains the information
which can be precomputed by it.
(vi) {Valid, Invalid}
←
SA-Verify(Server(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚) ,
(𝑚,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString)
). This is an interactive protocol
Verifier
between the server and the verifier where the
server takes 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 as input and the verifier
takes (𝑚, 𝜎, 𝑝𝑘, VString) as inputs. Finally, the verifier
outputs Valid if the server can convince it that 𝜎
is a valid signature on 𝑚. Otherwise, the verifier
outputs Invalid.
In a SA verification signature scheme, we assume that the
verifier has a limited computational ability and is not able
to perform all computations in Verify alone. So, a SA verification signature scheme must satisfy an important property
called computation saving property, which requires that the
computations performed by the verifier in SA-Verify must
be less than those performed in Verify.
2.4. Security Model for Server-Aided Verification Signature.
In the following, we will first present the security model for
SAV-Σ with message privacy. As for the existential unforgeability of SAV-Σ, we will adopt existential unforgeability of
SAV-Σ defined in [15], including the existential unforgeability
against adaptive chosen message attacks of Σ defined in [24]
and the soundness against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks of SA-Verify. In the following, we will
present the existential unforgeability of SAV-Σ as [15]. It
requires that the adversary should not be (computationally)
capable of producing a signature of a new message which can
be proved as valid by SA-Verify, even if the adversary acts as
a server.
Definition 1 (existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks of Σ). The adversary A and the challenger C play the following game.
(i) Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms
ParamGen and KeyGen to obtain system parameter
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 and one key pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). The adversary A is
given 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 and 𝑝𝑘.
(ii) Queries. The adversary A is allowed to make at most
𝑞𝑠 sign queries. For each sign query 𝑚𝑖 ∈ {𝑚1 , . . . ,
𝑚𝑞𝑠 }, the challenger C returns 𝜎𝑖 = Sign(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚,
𝑚𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) as the response.
(iii) Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a pair
(𝑚∗ , 𝜎∗ ) and wins the game if:
(1) 𝑚∗ ∉ {𝑚1 , . . . , 𝑚𝑞𝑠 };
(2) Verify(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚∗ , 𝜎∗ , 𝑝𝑘) = Valid.
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An adversary A is said to (𝑡, 𝑞𝑠 , 𝜀)-break a signature
scheme Σ if A runs in time at most 𝑡 and makes at most 𝑞𝑠
signature queries and the success probability Σ − AdvA to win
the game above is at most 𝜀.
We say that Σ is existentially unforgeable against adaptive
chosen message attacks if there exists an adversary that
(𝑡, 𝑞𝑠 , 𝜀)-breaks it.
In the following, we will present the soundness against
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks of SA-Verify
which means that the server cannot prove an invalid signature
to be valid even if it colludes with the signer.
Definition 2 (soundness against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks of SA-Verify). The adversary A and the
challenger C play the following game.
(i) Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms
ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain the system parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, one key pair (𝑠𝑘,
𝑝𝑘) and VString. The adversary A is given 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚
and (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘).
(ii) Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A is
allowed to make at most 𝑞V server-aided verification
queries. The challenger C responds by executing SAVerify with the adversary A, where the adversary A
acts as the server and the challenger C acts as the
verifier. At the end of each execution, the challenger
returns the output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
(iii) Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a message 𝑚∗ . The challenger C chooses a random invalid
signature 𝜎∗ on the message 𝑚∗ . Namely, it chooses a
random element 𝜎∗ in Ω \ Ω𝑚∗ , where Ω and Ω𝑚∗ are,
respectively, the signature space and the set of valid
signatures of 𝑚∗ . We say that A wins the game if
SA-Verify (A, C(𝑚

∗

,𝜎∗ ,𝑝𝑘,VString)

) = Valid.

(1)

An adversary A is said to (𝑡, 𝑞V , 𝜀)-break SA-Verify’s
soundness against collusion and chosen message attacks if
A runs in time at most 𝑡, makes at most 𝑞V server-aided
verification queries and the success probability Adv𝐸𝑈
A to win
the game above is at least 𝜀.
We say that SA-Verify is (𝑡, 𝑞V , 𝜀)-sound against collusion
and chosen message attacks if there exists no adversary that
(𝑡, 𝑞V , 𝜀)-breaks it.

3. Server-Aided Verification Signature with
Message Privacy
In this section, we will present the definition of message
privacy for SA-Verify, and then, based on Waters signature
scheme [21], present a concrete server-aided verification
scheme with this privacy property. This privacy property is
called message privacy against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks. In this definition, the server is allowed to
collude with the signer. Concretely, the server can obtain

the key pair (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) of the signer and therefore can create the
signature on any message. In addition, we will assume that the
server cannot obtain the message-signature pairs that have
been created by the signer before, alternatively, the signer
will not store any message-signature pair that it has created.
(Actually, this can be achieved by performing blind signature
scheme presented in [25] between the signer and the verifier
instead of performing the ordinary signature scheme. After
the blind signature scheme, the verifier can obtain the
ordinary message-signature pair without the signer learning
anything about this pair. Then the verifier lets the server to
verify the message-signature pair by performing SA-Verify.
In this sense, even if the server colludes with the signer, it
cannot obtain more information about the signed messages
from the signer than it can obtain on its own. To clarify our
privacy definition below more clearly, we simply assume that
the server cannot obtain any message-signature pair which
the signer has created for the verifier before.)
3.1. Definition of Message Privacy. A server-aided verification
signature scheme with message privacy SAV-Σ also consists
of six algorithms: ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SAVerifier-Setup, and SA-Verify. The following is the definition
of message privacy for the server-aided verification protocol
under the collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
In this definition, the server cannot obtain any information
about the message to be verified under the collusion and
adaptive chosen message attacks.
Definition 3 (message privacy of SA-Verify). We say
that SA-Verify satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 𝜀)-message privacy against
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks if there
exists no adversary A who runs in time at most 𝑡, makes
at most 𝑞V server-aided verification queries, and succeeds
with probability at least 𝜀 in the following game with the
challenger C. The game is defined as follows.
(i) Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms
ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain
system parameter param, one key pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘),
and VString. The adversary A is given param and
(𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). Note that A can generate any messagesignature pair with the secret-public key pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘);
however as we assumed, it cannot obtain any
message-signature pair that has been created by the
signer before.
(ii) Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A is
allowed to make at most 𝑞V server-aided verification
queries. The challenger C responds by executing SAVerify with the adversary A, where the adversary A
acts as the server and the challenger C acts as the
verifier. At the end of each execution, the challenger
returns the output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
(iii) Challenge. A outputs two messages 𝑚0 , 𝑚1 , and
sends them to the challenger C. C chooses a bit
𝑏 ∈ {0, 1} at random and also chooses an element
𝜎 either randomly from Ω𝑚0 or randomly from Ω𝑚1 ,
where Ω𝑚0 and Ω𝑚1 are, respectively, the signature
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space of 𝑚0 and 𝑚1 . Then C and A interact with each
other by running SA-Verify(A, C(𝑚𝑏 ,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString) ),
where A plays as a server and C plays as a verifier.
After the interaction, C sends the output of SAVerify(A, C(𝑚𝑏 ,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString) ) to A.

Verifier (param, 𝐾1 )
Input: (𝑚, 𝜎 = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 )), pk = (𝑉,⃗ PK)
𝑀 = 𝑉0 ∏ 𝑉𝑖 ,
𝑖∈M

𝑟, 𝑑 ∈𝑅 Z∗𝑝 , 𝑀 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 , 𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑟

𝑀 ,𝜎1 ,𝜎2

(iv) Output. Finally, A outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}. We say that
A wins the game with probability 𝜀 if
Pr [𝑏 = 𝑏 ] ≥ 𝜀.

(2)

Similar to Wu et al. [15], in the protocol Setup of the
game above, VString is not provided to the adversary who
now is acting as a server since VString might contain some
private information of the verifier, which must be kept secret
in server-aided verification signatures. In the definition,
adversary A acts as the server and the challenger C acts as
the verifier which will help A to extract some information
from VString.
3.2. Concrete SA Verification Signature with Message Privacy.
In the following, we will first present a concrete SA
verification signature scheme with message privacy based on
Waters signature [21]. The SA verification signature scheme
with message privacy SAV-Σ consists of six algorithms:
ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SA-Verifier-Setup, and
SA-Verify. The first four algorithms are the same as those in
Waters signature scheme [21]. As we know that, due to the
elegant properties of pairing computation on elliptic curves,
pairing has been widely employed as a building block for lots
of cryptographic schemes, in particular in the construction
of digital signatures. However, performing a pairing on
an elliptic curve requires much more computational cost
than executing both an exponentiation and a multiplication
[16, 26–30], and for a power-constrained verifier who
must execute multiple pairing computations during the
verification of a message-signature pair, reducing the
computational load of it is a meaningful task. In Waters
signature [21], the verifier has to compute two pairings;
however in SAV-Σ, its computational load is reduced and it
will not compute any pairing. The concrete SA verification
signature with message privacy based on Waters signature is
described in detail as follows.
(i) 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ← ParamGen. Let 𝜅 be a security parameter,
(G1 , G𝑇 ) be bilinear groups where |G1 | = |G𝑇| = 𝑝 for
some prime number 𝑝 ≥ 2𝜅 and 𝑔 be a generator of
G1 . 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G𝑇 is a bilinear mapping. The
system parameters are 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 = (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒)
and the message space is M = {0, 1}𝑛 .
(ii) (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) ← KeyGen(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). Given the system parameters (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒), the signer chooses a random
element 𝑥 ∈ Z𝑝 , generates the public key 𝑝𝑘 as
(𝑉,⃗ 𝑃𝐾) and 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥 where 𝑉⃗ is a vector consisting
of 𝑛 + 1 elements 𝑉0 , 𝑉1 , . . . , 𝑉𝑛 randomly selected in
G1 and 𝑃𝐾 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑥 .

Server (param)

→
𝐾2 = 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑔),
𝐾3 = 𝑒(𝑀 , 𝜎2 )
𝐾2 ,𝐾3

Output:
Valid, if 𝐾2 = 𝐾3 ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑 ;
Invalid, if otherwise.

←

Algorithm 1: SA-Verify with message privacy based on Waters
signature.

(iii) 𝜎 ← Sign(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). For an 𝑛-bit message
𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛 , let M ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛} be the set of all
𝑖 for which the 𝑖th bit of 𝑚 is 1. The signer selects a
random element 𝑡 ∈ Z𝑝 and generates the signature 𝜎
as (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) = (𝑔𝑥 (𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 )𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 ).
(iv) {Valid, Invalid} ← Verify(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝜎, 𝑝𝑘). The verifier takes as input a claimed message-signature pair
(𝑚, 𝜎), and outputs Valid if and only if 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑔) =
𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝑒(𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 , 𝜎2 ). Otherwise it outputs Invalid.
(v) VString ← SA-Verify-Setup(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). The verifier
takes as inputs the system parameters (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝,
𝑔, 𝑒) and computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) as VString.
(vi) {Valid, Invalid}
←
SA-Verify(Server(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚) ,
(𝑚,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString)
). This is an interactive protocol
Verifier
between the server and the verifier which is shown in
Algorithm 1.
(1) Verifier, for a message-signature pair (𝑚, 𝜎 =
(𝜎1 , 𝜎2 )) to be verified, first computes 𝑀 =
𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 ; then selects randomly 𝑟, 𝑑 ∈ Z∗𝑝 , and
blinds the message by computing 𝑀 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 ,
𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑟 ; finally sends (𝑀 , 𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) to the
verifier.
(2) Server computes 𝐾2 = 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑔), 𝐾3 = 𝑒(𝑀 , 𝜎2 )
and returns 𝐾2 , 𝐾3 to the verifier.
(3) Verifier checks the equation 𝐾2 = 𝐾3 ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅
𝐾1𝑑 , and outputs Valid if it holds, and otherwise
outputs Invalid.
Correctness of SA-Verify. For a claimed message-signature
pair (𝑚, 𝜎), when the verifier and the server are both honest,
namely, the verifier correctly computes 𝑀 and 𝜎1 and the
server correctly computes 𝐾2 and 𝐾3 , then the verification
equation 𝐾2 = 𝑃𝐾⋅𝐾3 ⋅𝐾1𝑑 holds if the message-signature pair
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(𝑚, 𝜎) is valid and otherwise does not hold. In the following,
we denote (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) = (𝑔𝑥 (𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 )𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 ):
𝐾2 = 𝑒 (𝜎1 , 𝑔)

signatures of 𝑚∗ . Then they interact with each other as
described in the SA-Verify protocol. Concretely, the
challenger chooses two random elements 𝑟∗ , 𝑑∗ ∈ Z∗𝑝 ,
∗

computes 𝑀 = 𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 , 𝑀 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 and 𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅
∗
∗
𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑟 , and sends (𝑀 , 𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) to the adversary. Then
the adversary returns 𝐾2∗ and 𝐾3∗ to the challenger.

𝑑

= 𝑒 (𝜎1 , 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝜎2𝑟 , 𝑔)
𝑡

= 𝑒 (𝑀, 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑 ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔𝑡𝑟 , 𝑔)
𝑡

= 𝑒 (𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 , 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑

∗

(3)

= 𝑒 (𝑀 , 𝜎2 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑
= 𝐾3 ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑 .
In the following, by Theorems 4 and 5, we will show that
our SA verification signature scheme above is secure under
our security model; namely, the SA verification protocol
described in Algorithm 1 is sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks and also satisfies message privacy
against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Since Waters signature scheme has been proved existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks,
in order to prove that our SA verification signature scheme
above is secure, we need only to prove that the SA verification
protocol described in Algorithm 1 satisfies soundness against
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks defined in
Definition 2 and message privacy against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Theorem 4. The SA verification protocol described in Algorithm 1 satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/(𝑝 − 1))-soundness against collusion
and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. In order to prove that the SA verification protocol
in Algorithm 1 is (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/(𝑝 − 1))-sound against collusion
and adaptive chosen message attacks, we will show that the
adversary can only prove an invalid signature as valid with at
most probability 1/(𝑝 − 1). The challenger and the adversary
play the following game.
(i) Setup. The challenger generates the system parameters (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒), chooses a random element
𝑥 ∈ Z𝑝 , and sets 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥 and 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑉,⃗ 𝑃𝐾) where 𝑉⃗
is a vector consisting of 𝑛 + 1 elements 𝑉0 , 𝑉1 , . . . , 𝑉𝑛
randomly selected in G1 and 𝑃𝐾 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑥 . Then it
also computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔). Finally the challenger
sends (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) to the adversary.
(ii) Queries. The adversary A is allowed to make at most
𝑞V server-aided verification queries. The challenger C
responds by executing SA-Verify with the adversary
A, where the adversary A acts as the server and the
challenger C acts as the verifier. At the end of each
execution, the challenger returns the output of SAVerify to the adversary A.
(iii) Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a message 𝑚∗ . The challenger C chooses a random element
𝜎∗ = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) in G21 \ Ω𝑚∗ , where Ω and Ω𝑚∗ are,
respectively, the signature space and the set of valid

In the following, we will show that 𝐾2∗ = 𝐾3∗ ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑
happens with probability 1/(𝑝 − 1).
The challenger sends (𝑀 , 𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) to A such that
∗

𝑀 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 ,
∗

𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑟

∗

(4)

⇓
𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝑀 = 𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝑀 + 𝑟∗ ,
𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝜎1 = 𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝜎1 + 𝑑∗ + 𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝜎2 ⋅ 𝑟∗ .

(5)

Since the adversary can only obtain (𝑀 , 𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) from
the challenger, from the equation set (5), we can see
that the adversary can only obtain 𝑑∗ with probability
1/(𝑝 − 1). Furthermore, from (6) below, we can
directly deduce (7) as follows:
∗

𝐾2∗ = 𝐾3∗ ⋅ 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑑
⇓
𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) (

𝐾2∗
) = 𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) 𝑃𝐾 + 𝑑∗ .
𝐾3∗

(6)

(7)

Since the adversary can only guess 𝑑∗ with probability
1/(𝑝 − 1), and (𝐾2∗ /𝐾3∗ ) is uniquely determined by
𝑑∗ , the adversary can only give out a pair (𝐾2∗ , 𝐾3∗ )
satisfying (6) with probabitity 1/(𝑝 − 1). This
completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. The SA verification protocol in Algorithm 1 satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/2)-message privacy against collusion and adaptive
chosen message attacks.
Proof. In order to prove that the SA verification protocol
in Algorithm 1 satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/2)-message privacy against
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks, we will
show that the adversary can only succeed with at most the
probability 1/2 in the game with the challenger described as
follows.
(i) Setup. The challenger generates the system parameter
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒), and the secret key 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥 and
public key 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑉,⃗ 𝑃𝐾), where 𝑉⃗ is a vector consisting of 𝑛 + 1 elements 𝑉0 , 𝑉1 , . . . , 𝑉𝑛 randomly
selected in G1 and 𝑃𝐾 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑥 . Then it also
computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔). Finally the challenger sends
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) to the adversary.
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(ii) Queries. The adversary A is allowed to make at most
𝑞V server-aided verification queries. The challenger C
responds by executing SA-Verify with the adversary
A, and, at the end of each execution, returns the
output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
(iii) Challenge. A outputs two messages 𝑚0 and 𝑚1 and
sends them to the challenger C. C chooses a bit 𝑏 ∈
{0, 1} at random and also chooses 𝜎 = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) either
randomly from Ω𝑚0 or randomly from Ω𝑚1 , where
Ω𝑚0 and Ω𝑚1 are, respectively, the signature spaces of
𝑚0 and 𝑚1 . Then C and A interact with each other
by running SA-Verify(A, C(𝑚𝑏 ,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString) ), where A
plays as a server and C plays as a verifier. Concretely,
the challenger chooses two random elements 𝑟∗ , 𝑑∗ ∈
∗
Z∗𝑝 , computes 𝑀 = 𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 , 𝑀 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 ,
∗

∗

and 𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑟 , and sends (𝑀 , 𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) to
the adversary. Then the adversary returns 𝐾2∗ and 𝐾3∗
to the challenger. After the interaction, C sends the
output of SA-Verify(A, C(𝑚𝑏 ,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString) ) to A.

(iv) Output. Finally, A outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}. We will
show that A can only succeed with probability 1/2.
From the equation set (5) in the proof of Theorem 4,
we can see that there exist two pairs (𝑀0 , 𝑟0∗ ) and
∗
(𝑀1 , 𝑟1∗ ) satisfying 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑏 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟𝑏 for 𝑏 = 0, 1, and
for each 𝑟𝑏∗ , there exist 𝑝 − 1 pairs (𝜎1 , 𝑑∗ ) satisfying
∗

𝑟∗

𝜎1 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝑔𝑑 ⋅ 𝜎2𝑏 for 𝑏 = 0, 1. So the adversary cannot
obtain anything about (𝑀, 𝜎1 ). Though the adversary
learns 𝜎2 which may correspond to 𝑚0 or 𝑚1 , it only
guess 𝑏 correctly with probability 1/2. This completes
the proof of Theorem 4.

Efficiency Analysis. The SA verification signature with privacy
based on Waters signature above is computation saving and
efficient. In the following, we will analyze the efficiency
of SA-Verify algorithm by comparing that of Waters signature scheme. In Waters signature scheme [21], to verify a
message-signature pair (𝑚, 𝜎 = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 )), the verifier needs
to compute 𝑀 = 𝑉0 ∏𝑖∈M 𝑉𝑖 which takes 𝑛 multiplications
in G1 , 𝑃𝐾 ⋅ 𝑒(𝑚, 𝜎2 ) which takes 1 multiplication in G𝑇,
and two pairings 𝑒(𝑚, 𝜎2 ) and 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑔). However, in our
server-aided verification signature scheme, the verifier can
first precompute a pairing 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) which can be used by
multiple SA-Verify protocols. Then in a SA-Verify protocol,
we can see that the verifier needs to compute totally 3
exponentiations in G1 and 1 exponentiation in G𝑇 as well
as 3 + 𝑛 multiplications in G1 and 3 multiplications in
G𝑇 . As we know that, performing a pairing on an elliptic
curve requires much more computational cost than executing
both an exponentiation and a multiplication. So our SA
verification signature scheme based on Waters signature is
computation saving and efficient.
The concrete computation cost comparison of the verifier
in the verification of Waters Signature [21] and our SA-Verify
in Algorithm 1 is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Efficiency of the SA verification signature scheme.
Verification
Waters [21]
Our Scheme

Pairing
2
0

Exponentiation
0
3(G1 ) + 1(G𝑇 )

Multiplication
𝑛(G1 )
(3 + 𝑛)(G1 ) + 3(G𝑇 )

4. Server-Aided Verification Signature with
Message-Signature Privacy
In this section, we will present a stronger definition of privacy,
namely, message-signature privacy against collusion and
adaptive chosen message attacks. Then based on BLS signature scheme [18], a concrete server-aided verification scheme
with this privacy property will be presented. We assume that
the server can obtain the key pair (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) of the signer and
cannot obtain the message-signature pairs that have been
created by the signer. Under this assumption, the server
cannot obtain anything about the message-signature pair.
4.1. Definition of Message-Signature Privacy. A server-aided
verification signature scheme with message-signature privacy
SAV-Σ also consists of six algorithms: ParamGen, KeyGen,
Sign, Verify, SA-Verifier-Setup, and SA-Verify.
Definition 6 (message-signature privacy of SA-Verify). We
say that SA-Verify satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 𝜀)-message-signature privacy against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks if
there exists no adversary A who runs in time at most 𝑡, makes
at most 𝑞V server-aided verification queries, and succeeds
with probability at least 𝜀 in the following game with the
challenger C. The game is defined as follows.
(i)

Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms
ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain
the system parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, one key pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘),
and VString. The adversary A is given 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 and
(𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). Similar to the definition of message privacy for SA verification signature, A can generate any message-signature pair with the key pair
(𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘); however as we assumed, it cannot obtain any
message-signature pair that has been created by the
signer before.

(ii) Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A is
allowed to make at most 𝑞V server-aided verification
queries. The challenger C responds by executing SAVerify with the adversary A, where the adversary A
acts as the server and the challenger C acts as the
verifier. At the end of each execution, the challenger
returns the output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
(iii) Challenge. A outputs two pairs (𝑀0 , 𝜎0 ) and (𝑀1 , 𝜎1 ),
where 𝜎𝑖 is a valid signature on 𝑀𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2. Then
A sends them to the challenger C. C chooses a bit 𝑏 ∈
{0, 1} at random and interacts with A by running SAVerify(A, C(𝑀𝑏 ,𝜎𝑏 ,𝑝𝑘,VString) ) where A plays as a server
and C plays as a verifier. After the interaction, C sends
the output of SA-Verify(A, C(𝑀𝑏 ,𝜎𝑏 ,𝑝𝑘,VString) ) to A.
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Verifier (param, 𝐾1 )
Input: (𝑚, 𝜎), pk
𝑟, 𝑡 ∈𝑅 Z∗𝑝 , 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑚) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡 ,
𝜎 = 𝜎 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 ; 𝐾2 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑝𝑘)

Server (param)

𝑚 ,𝜎

→
𝐾3 ,𝐾4

Output:
Valid, if 𝐾3 = 𝐾1𝑟 ⋅ 𝐾2−𝑡 ⋅ 𝐾4 ;
Invalid, if otherwise.

𝐾3 = 𝑒(𝜎 , 𝑔);
𝐾4 = 𝑒(𝑚 , 𝑝𝑘)

←

Algorithm 2: SA verification Signature with message-signature
privacy based on BLS signature.

(iv) Output. Finally, A outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}. We say
that A wins the game with probability 𝜀 if
Pr [𝑏 = 𝑏 ] ≥ 𝜀.
(8)
4.2. Concrete SA Verification Signature with MessageSignature Privacy. In this section, we will present a SA
verification signature scheme which satisfies messagesignature privacy against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks. This scheme is constructed based on
BLS signature [18], which also consists of six algorithms:
ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SA-Verifier-Setup, and
SA-Verify. The first four algorithms are the same as those in
BLS signature scheme [18]. By executing the SA-VerifierSetup and SA-Verify algorithms, the computational load of
the verifier can be reduced. In BLS signature [18], the verifier
has to compute two pairings; however in the following
SAV-Σ, it needs only to compute a pairing.
(i) 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ← ParamGen. Let 𝜅 be a security parameter,
(G1 , G𝑇 ) be bilinear groups, where |G1 | = |G𝑇 | = 𝑝
for some prime number 𝑝 ≥ 2𝜅 , and 𝑔 be a generator
of G1 . 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G𝑇 is a bilinear mapping.
𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a hash function. The system
parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 = (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝐻).
(ii) (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) ← KeyGen(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). Given the system
parameters (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒), the signer chooses a
random element 𝑥 ∈ Z𝑝 , and sets the public key
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑔𝑥 and the secret key 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥.
(iii) 𝜎 ← Sign(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘). For a message, the
signer generates the signature 𝜎 = 𝐻(𝑚)𝑥 .
(iv) {Valid, Invalid} ← Verify(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑚, 𝜎, 𝑝𝑘). The verifier takes as inputs a claimed message-signature pair
(𝑚, 𝜎), and outputs Valid if and only if 𝑒(𝜎, 𝑔) =
𝑒(𝐻(𝑚), 𝑝𝑘), and otherwise outputs Invalid.
(v) VString ← SA-Verify-Setup(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚). The verifier
takes as inputs the system parameter (𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝,
𝑔, 𝑒) and computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) as VString.
(vi) {Valid, Invalid} ← SA-Verify(Server(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚) , and
Verifier(𝑚,𝜎,𝑝𝑘,VString) ). This is an interactive protocol
between the server and the verifier which is shown in
Algorithm 2.

(1) Verifier, for a message-signature pair (𝑚, 𝜎),
blinds the pair by selecting randomly 𝑟, 𝑡 ∈ Z∗𝑝
and computing 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑚) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡 , 𝜎 = 𝜎 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 ;
𝐾2 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑝𝑘), and sends (𝑚 , 𝜎 ) to the verifier.
(2) Server computes 𝐾3 = 𝑒(𝜎 , 𝑔), 𝐾4 = 𝑒(𝑚 , 𝑝𝑘)
and returns 𝐾3 , 𝐾4 to the verifier.
(3) Verifier checks the equation 𝐾3 = 𝐾1𝑟 ⋅ 𝐾2−𝑡 ⋅
𝐾4 , and outputs Valid if it holds, and otherwise
outputs Invalid.
Correctness of SA-Verify. For a claimed message-signature
pair (𝑚, 𝜎), when the verifier and the server are both honest,
namely, the verifier correctly computes 𝑚 , 𝜎 and 𝐾2 , and the
server correctly computes 𝐾3 and 𝐾4 ; then the verification
equation 𝐾3 = 𝐾1𝑟 ⋅ 𝐾2−𝑡 ⋅ 𝐾4 holds if the message-signature
pair (𝑚, 𝜎) is valid and otherwise does not hold. Consider
𝐾3 = 𝑒 (𝜎 , 𝑔)
= 𝑒 (𝜎, 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔𝑟 , 𝑔)
𝑟

= 𝑒 (𝐻 (𝑚)𝑥 , 𝑔) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑔)
= 𝑒 (𝐻 (𝑚) , 𝑝𝑘) ⋅ 𝐾1𝑟

(9)

= 𝑒 (𝑚 ⋅ 𝑔−𝑡 , 𝑝𝑘) ⋅ 𝐾1𝑟
−𝑡

= 𝑒 (𝑚 , 𝑝𝑘) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑝𝑘) ⋅ 𝐾1𝑟
= 𝐾4 ⋅ 𝐾2−𝑡 ⋅ 𝐾1𝑟 .
In the following, by Theorems 7 and 8, we will show that
our SA verification signature scheme above is secure under
our security model; namely, the SA verification protocol
described in Algorithm 2 is sound against collusion and
adaptive chosen message attacks and also satisfies messagesignature privacy against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks.
Theorem 7. The SA verification protocol described in Algorithm 2 satisfies soundness against collusion and adaptive
chosen message attacks.
Proof. In order to prove that the SA verification protocol
in Algorithm 2 is (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/(𝑝 − 1))-sound against collusion
and adaptive chosen message attacks, we will show that the
adversary can only prove an invalid signature as valid with at
most probability 1/(𝑝 − 1). The challenger and the adversary
play the following game.
(i) Setup. The challenger generates the system parameter
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝐻), chooses a random element 𝑥 ∈
Z𝑝 , and sets 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥 and 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑔𝑥 . Then it also
computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔). Finally the challenger sends
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝐻, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) to the adversary.
(ii) Queries. The adversary A is allowed to make at most
𝑞V server-aided verification queries. The challenger C
responds by executing SA-Verify with the adversary
A. At the end of each execution, the challenger
returns the output of SA-Verify to the adversary.
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(iii) Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a message 𝑚∗ . The challenger C chooses a random element
𝜎∗ in G1 \Ω𝑚∗ , where Ω𝑚∗ is the set of valid signatures
of 𝑚∗ . Then they interact with each other as described
in the SA-Verify protocol. Concretely, the challenger
chooses two random elements 𝑟∗ , 𝑡∗ ∈ Z∗𝑝 , computes
∗

∗

∗

In the following, we will show that 𝐾3∗ = 𝐾1𝑟 ⋅𝐾2−𝑡 ⋅𝐾4∗
happens with probability 1/(𝑝 − 1).
From (10), we can directly deduce (11):
∗

𝑚 = 𝐻 (𝑚) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡 ,
𝜎 = 𝜎 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟

∗

(10)

⇓
𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝑚 = 𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝐻 (𝑚) + 𝑡∗ ,
𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝜎 = 𝐷𝐿 𝑔 𝜎 + 𝑟∗ .

Exponentiation
0
2(G1 ) + 2(G𝑇 )

Multiplication
0
2(G1 ) + 2(G𝑇 )

Hash
1
1

=

∗
𝐾1𝑟

⋅

∗
𝐾2−𝑡

⋅

𝐾4∗

⇓
𝐾3∗
) = 𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) 𝐾1∗ ⋅ 𝑟∗ − 𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) 𝐾2∗ ⋅ 𝑡∗ .
𝐾4∗

(ii) Queries. The adversary A is allowed to make at most
𝑞V server-aided verification queries. The challenger C
responds by executing SA-Verify with the adversary
A, and, at the end of each execution, returns the
output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
(iii) Challenge. A outputs two pairs (𝑚0 , 𝜎0 ) and (𝑚1 , 𝜎1 ),
where 𝜎𝑖 is a valid signature on 𝑚𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2. Then it
sends them to the challenger C. C chooses a bit 𝑏 ∈
{0, 1} at random and interacts with A by running SAVerify(A, Cm𝑏 ,𝜎𝑏 ,𝑝𝑘,VString ). Concretely, the challenger
chooses two random elements 𝑟∗ , 𝑡∗ ∈ Z∗𝑝 , computes
∗

(11)

Since (𝑡∗ , 𝑟∗ ) is chosen randomly from Z∗𝑝 , from
the equation set (7), we can see that the adversary
can only obtain 𝑚 and 𝜎 with probability 1/(𝑝 −
1). Furthermore, from the following, (13) can be
deduced:

𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) (

Verification Pairing
BLS [18]
2
Our scheme
1

∗

𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑚) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡 , 𝜎 = 𝜎 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 and 𝐾2 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑝𝑘), and
sends (𝑚 , 𝜎 ) to the adversary. Then the adversary
returns 𝐾3∗ and 𝐾4∗ to the challenger.

𝐾3∗

Table 2: Efficiency of the SA verification signature scheme.

(12)

(13)

We can see that 𝐾3∗ /𝐾4∗ is determined by 𝑟∗ and 𝑡∗ .
Since 𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) 𝐾1∗ ⋅ 𝑟∗ − 𝐷𝐿 𝑒(𝑔,𝑔) 𝐾2∗ ⋅ 𝑡∗ is a random
element in Z∗𝑝 , the adversary can only give out a pair
(𝐾3∗ , 𝐾4∗ ) satisfying (11) with probabitity 1/(𝑝 − 1).
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Theorem 8. The SA verification protocol described in Algorithm 2 satisfies message-signature privacy against collusion
and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. In order to prove that the SA verification protocol in
Algorithm 2 satisfies (𝑡, 𝑞V , 1/2)-message-signature privacy
against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks, we
will show that the adversary can only succeed with at most
probability 1/2 in the game with the challenger described as
follows.
(i) Setup. The challenger generates the system parameter
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝐻), and the secret key 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑥
and the public key 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑔𝑥 . Then it also computes 𝐾1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔). Finally the challenger sends
(𝜅, G1 , G𝑇 , 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑒, 𝐻, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) to the adversary.

∗

𝑚𝑏 = 𝐻(𝑚𝑏 ) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡 , 𝜎𝑏 = 𝜎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 and 𝐾2 =
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑝𝑘), and sends (𝑚𝑏 , 𝜎𝑏 ) to the adversary. Then
the adversary returns 𝐾3∗ and 𝐾4∗ to the challenger.
After the interaction, C sends the output of SAVerify(A, C(𝑚𝑏 ,𝜎𝑏 ,𝑝𝑘,VString) ) to A.

(iv) Output. Finally, A outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}. We will
show that A can only succeed with probability 1/2.
From the equation set (10) in the proof of Theorem 4,
we can see that there exist two pairs (𝑚0 , 𝑡0∗ ) and
∗
(𝑚1 , 𝑡1∗ ) satisfying 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑚𝑏 ) ⋅ 𝑔𝑡𝑏 for 𝑐 = 0, 1, and
there exist two pairs (𝜎0 , 𝑟0∗ ) and (𝜎1 , 𝑟1∗ ) satisfying
∗
𝜎 = 𝜎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑔𝑟 for 𝑐 = 0, 1. So the adversary cannot
obtain anything about (𝑚𝑏 , 𝜎𝑏 ), and it only guesses
𝑏 correctly with probability 1/2. This completes the
proof of Theorem 8.

Efficiency Analysis. In the following, we will show that our
SA verification signature scheme based on BLS signature
above is computation saving and efficient. We will analyze
the efficiency of SA-Verify algorithm by comparing that of
BLS Signature scheme [18]. In BLS signature scheme [18],
to verify a message-signature pair (𝑚, 𝜎), the verifier needs
to compute 𝐻(𝑚) which takes 1 hash function and two
bilinear pairings 𝑒(𝐻(𝑚), 𝑝𝑘) and 𝑒(𝜎, 𝑔). However, in our
server-aided verification signature scheme, the verifier can
first precompute a pairing 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) which can be used by
multiple SA-Verify protocols. Then in a SA-Verify protocol,
the verifier needs to compute totally 2 exponentiations in G1
and 2 exponentiation in G𝑇 as well as 2 multiplications in
G1 and 2 multiplications in G𝑇 and 1 hash function. From
the comparison, we can see that our SA verification signature
scheme based on BLS signature is computation saving. The
concrete computation cost comparison of the verifier in the
verification of BLS signature and SA-Verify in Algorithm 2
is shown in Table 2.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the SA verification signature
schemes with message-signature privacy for mobile computing. A power-constrained mobile device can outsource the
verification of a signature to a server with powerful resources
in order to reduce its computational load. We first present two
definitions for privacy of server-aided verification protocol,
respectively, named message privacy and message-signature
privacy under collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Then under our security models, two concrete constructions
based on existing signature schemes were presented and
proved secure. By efficiency analysis, we showed that the two
concrete schemes are both computation saving and efficient.
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